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Executive summary
It would be easy for the public to believe that al-Qaeda 
inspired terrorism is a new feature of the African security 
landscape, yet the ideology, personnel and links between 
groups have been growing for the past 25 years. That said, 
it’s really over the past decade that various groups that 
had been operating with a predominantly nationalistic 
agenda have increasingly become aligned with al-Qaeda in 
name, ideology, methodologies of attack and tactics. A new 
jihadism is spreading across Africa. This paper examines three 
of those groups—Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), 
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underlying socioeconomic drivers that encourage young men 
to join their ranks. This will require continued investment in 
strengthening regional cooperation on intelligence sharing 
and raising the level of border security and policing efforts 
to minimise the groups’ operating space and ability to 
raise funds. The key to African nations’ responses will be 
winning back the hearts and minds of local populations, 
harnessing their cooperation, and starving the groups 
of local support and the ability to continue unrestricted 
cross-border movements.
Unfortunately, if the situation’s allowed to continue, there is 
danger that we’ll see a rise in instability in the regions where 
the groups operate, and in their growth and ambition.
A shifting target—al-Qaeda 2.0
Al-Qaeda’s shift in geographical focus (if there ever truly was 
one) has well and truly been completed. Rather than creating 
a conventional terrorist network in the mould that most 
would conceive, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri 
had always intended that they would provide the ideological 
motivations, funding, contacts and expert advice for other 
militant organisations, wherever their location. In 2004, 
before most analysts had foreseen this shift, Jason Burke 
outlined the shape of the al-Qaeda to come:
There is no longer a central hub for Islamic militancy. 
But the al Qaeda worldview, or ‘al Qaedaism,’ is growing 
stronger every day. This radical internationalist ideology 
… has adherents among many individuals and groups, 
few of whom are currently linked in any substantial way 
to bin Laden or those around him. They merely follow his 
precepts, models, and methods. They act in the style of 
al Qaeda, but they are only part of al Qaeda in the very 
loosest sense.1
Over the past decade, a growing number of these groups have 
adopted elements of the ideology of al-Qaeda and the tactics 
and the motivations of the original core group of jihadists 
in Afghanistan. Some analysts assumed that al-Qaeda had 
been defeated with the death of bin Laden in 2011. Public 
rejoicing in the US was symptomatic of a drawn-out, costly 
and hard-fought battle to eradicate the instigator of  9/11 and 
the tormentor of US political and military power.
Following a perceived lull in activity after its leader’s death, 
the al-Qaeda that has emerged is one with a number of 
al-Shabaab and Boko Haram—and the way they’ve evolved, 
especially in the linkages between them and al-Qaeda’s 
ideology and tactics. All of these groups are separate from 
the al-Qaeda core. They haven’t taken up the al-Qaeda 
model because they’ve been told to, but they’re emulating 
it. They’re all looking to become dispersed, decentralised 
movements that frame local grievances in the language of the 
global jihad. They’re sharing tactics, training and personnel 
to further their respective causes while operating across 
national boundaries to escape capture and raise funds 
through criminal activities. Their attacks are becoming more 
ambitious and audacious and if left unchallenged could lead 
to the formation of terrorist safe havens.
Western governments are genuinely concerned that conflicts 
from northern Africa, the Sahara, the Sahel to the Horn of 
Africa are becoming more closely linked. Despite the relative 
success of the French military intervention in Mali in 2013, 
evidence shows that Islamist groups in Africa have a growing 
geographical reach and ambitions.
For the international community, the danger lies not so much 
in the immediate threat to Western targets from African 
Islamists, but in the potential future creation of a failed state 
that would provide a base for training and radicalising large 
numbers of Islamists, as Afghanistan did during the 1990s 
and Mali had the potential to do in 2012 and 2013. One of the 
most dangerous ways that groups in Africa contribute to the 
global terrorist threat is in the consistent flow of personnel 
into international combat zones where al-Qaeda/Islamist 
fighters are needed. Leaders of all the groups discussed in 
this paper fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s and 
supplied many fighters to the Iraq conflict in the 2000s. This 
has continued: around 200 Algerians have fought in Syria, 
along with 2,000 Tunisians, around 1,500 Moroccans and 
unknown numbers from Libya, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia and Sudan. The proven 
capacity of AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Shabaab to train and 
share fighting and bombmaking skills with new recruits, and 
then deliver those recruits into intensive front-line fighting 
roles in areas such as Syria and Iraq, will be the groups’ most 
immediate international impact.
There are no clear solutions for African states combating the 
Islamist groups that are ramping up the number, frequency 
and severity of attacks in the continent, but any solution 
will necessarily be complex. It will need to address not 
only the Islamists’ direct security challenge, but also the 
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respective causes while operating across national boundaries 
to escape capture and raise funds through criminal activities. 
Their attacks are becoming more ambitious and audacious 
and if left unchallenged could lead to the formation of 
terrorist ‘safe havens’.
Africa as a focus
Al-Qaeda in Africa can be traced back to 1991, when Osama 
bin Laden settled his family in Khartoum, Sudan, after 
arriving from Saudi Arabia. From Khartoum, he prepared 
al-Qaeda to broaden its scope of operations against mainly 
US targets and expanded his business interests to increase 
funding to the group. He brought with him his key senior 
military lieutenants, Abu Ubaydah al-Panshiri and his deputy 
Abu Hafs al-Masri, along with veterans from the al-Qaeda 
core, leaving a small staff behind in Afghanistan.
In Sudan, bin Laden trained fighters and built his 
understanding of other Islamist organisations in Africa that 
might have been open to support and collaboration. He 
created a safe haven for Islamist fighters fleeing Algeria, 
Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Bosnia, and the large number of 
Islamic scholars passing through the country fed his thinking 
about how to advance al-Qaeda’s ideology and operations.5 
He also reached out into nearby countries to begin building 
a network in Africa. In 1993 and 1994, bin Laden supplied 
weapons to fighters in Somalia, as he felt that country 
would make the perfect stronghold for al-Qaeda close to 
the Arabian Peninsula, from where he could build control 
of the Horn of Africa. In 1992, he sent Khalid al-Fawwaz to 
Nairobi to build the Kenyan network that eventually carried 
out the 1998 attacks on the US embassies there and in 
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
So, while it would be easy to think that al-Qaeda inspired 
terrorism is a new feature of the African security landscape, 
the ideology, personnel and links between groups have been 
growing for the past 25 years. However, it’s really over the 
past decade that various groups that had been operating 
with a mainly nationalistic agenda have increasingly become 
aligned with al-Qaeda in name, ideology, methodologies of 
attack and tactics. The following sections examine AQIM, 
al-Shabaab and Boko Haram and the ways that they have 
evolved, especially in the linkages between them and 
al-Qaeda’s core ideology and tactics. All of these groups 
are distinct from al-Qaeda core, they have not taken up the 
centres of gravity. The most significant is in Syria, where 
estimates suggest that as many as 12,000 individuals from 
81 nations have joined various Islamist groups (including 
those with close ties to al-Qaeda) fighting in the civil war 
since it began.2
This activity also resembles the conflict in Afghanistan in the 
1980s, where it all began. Iraq continues to suffer extremely 
high numbers of casualties from attacks by those who in 
the past or currently have links to al-Qaeda and its affiliates. 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen, still 
presents a threat within Yemen and to international targets, 
despite the death of its most notorious ideologue and 
recruiter, Anwar al-Awlaki. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) operates in vast portions of the Maghreb and Sahel 
regions of Africa, having expanded from its traditional base in 
Algeria, and was on the cusp of creating its own safe haven in 
northern Mali in 2013 before France intervened. Al-Shabaab, 
based in Somalia, continues to be a major problem, having 
instigated a horrific attack on the Westgate shopping centre 
in Nairobi, and Boko Haram is squarely in the spotlight 
after its recent abduction of 200 schoolgirls and a spate of 
bombings and shootings that claimed almost 2,000 lives in 
the first half of 2014 alone.
This has led the current director of the US Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, 
to state that he thinks that ‘al-Qaida is becoming more 
dangerous as it decentralizes, and through its franchises it 
has a bigger footprint today than on September 11, 2001’.3 
The US State Department’s 2013 global terrorism report 
appears to back this up, highlighting that the decentralisation 
and spread of al-Qaeda drove a 43% rise in worldwide 
terrorist attacks from 2012 to 2013.4 This trend is concerning 
and appears to demonstrate that, far from being in decline, 
al-Qaeda is re-emerging as a loose affiliation of dangerous 
groups with little if any direction from the al-Qaeda core 
element in Pakistan.
While there’s a great deal of analysis of many of these 
groups, the African al-Qaeda affiliates have begun to receive 
increasing scrutiny in recent months after demonstrating 
their willingness to strike international targets, move across 
international boundaries and use extreme violence to 
highlight their cause.
This paper shows AQIM, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are 
sharing tactics, training and personnel to further their 
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local populations. The GIA’s lack of restraint in the use of 
force tarnished its reputation among many other jihadists, 
including bin Laden and Abu Musab al-Suri, and as a result 
the group lost popular support by the mid-1990s.6 This led to 
a splintering of the group and one of the offshoots renaming 
itself the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (Groupe 
Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, GSPC) in 1998.
Led by Hassan Hattab, an ex-Algerian paratrooper who had 
left the GIA after rejecting its policy of attacking civilians, the 
GSPC refocused on targeting government security forces. 
Links to the al-Qaeda core can be traced back to evidence 
that some GSPC leaders and fighters trained and fought 
alongside the group in Afghanistan during the 1980s and 
1990s. Both Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (otherwise known as 
Abdelmalek Droukdel) and Mokhtar Belmokhtar certainly 
fought in that country during the 1990s.7 But the GSPC was 
largely focused on fighting the Algerian Government rather 
than global jihad, despite the fact that there had been 
attempts by bin Laden to forge closer ties with the group as 
long ago as 2002.8
In 2003, due to perceptions of weak leadership, Hattab was 
replaced as leader by Abu Ibrahim Mustafa. The GSPC had 
become geographically divided into two clear operational 
zones, north and south. The land north of the Atlas 
al-Qaeda model because they have been ordered to, but 
they are emulating the al-Qaeda model, namely they are all 
looking to become a dispersed, decentralised movement 
which frames local grievances in the language of the 
global jihad.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb—
operating across Algeria, Mali, Niger and 
the broader Sahel region
AQIM was the first al-Qaeda affiliate to set up officially in 
Africa. It has the most intimate relationship with al-Qaeda 
senior leadership, but while clearly inspired and guided by 
them, remains operationally independent. Its origins can be 
traced back to the 1990s and the armed Islamist resistance 
movement targeting the Algerian Government.
The Group Islamique Armé (GIA) emerged after the 1991 
Algerian elections were annulled. The military took control 
when Islamist parties were on the cusp of winning the 
elections. The GIA launched a brutal campaign against the 
government and the majority Sunni population, similar to the 
later campaign against Shia in Iraq by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. 
Its tactics included declaring fellow Muslims to be apostate, 
beheadings, mutilations and the widespread coercion of 
An undated grab from a video obtained by ANI Mauritanian news agency reportedly shows former Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM) emir Mokhtar Belmokhtar speaking at an undisclosed location. The one-eyed Islamist leader masterminded an assault on an 
Algerian gas plant that left 37 foreign hostages dead in January 2013. AFP PHOTO / HO / ANI via AAP.
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but haven’t yet materialised. This is somewhat surprising, 
because the GIA and GSPC had conducted attacks in France 
during the 1990s, so the networks and capability had clearly 
existed then, and existing al-Qaeda networks could have 
been harnessed. It may be that individuals with the skills 
required for attacks like that are in short supply; AQIM doesn’t 
have trouble attracting low-skilled fighters into its ranks, 
but those capable of acting clandestinely are more difficult 
to recruit. Strikes in mainland Europe should be possible 
using the group’s vast networks across North Africa and 
the diaspora in France. However, it’s most likely that AQIM 
hasn’t attacked Europe for two reasons: it doesn’t want to 
risk European nations pouring military and counterterrorism 
resources into its extermination, and it doesn’t want to 
endanger its extensive criminal activities, which not only fund 
its expansion but also act as a strong recruitment incentive. 
Local populations are poor, the Algerian state’s ability to 
provide for them is low to non-existent, and AQIM can offer 
work and a support structure.
Financing and infighting
Despite AQIM’s continuing strikes in the north of the country, 
most of its attacks since 2009 have been to the south of 
Algeria, around the intersection of the borders of Algeria, 
Niger, Mali and Mauritania (see Figure 1). Those attacks 
have mainly involved the kidnapping of foreign nationals 
for ransom. It’s thought that AQIM and, more to the point, 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who was the leading figure in its 
Sahelian operations, have produced vast revenue streams 
from such activities. A recent report stated that between 
2008 and 2012 revenues from kidnapping were as high as 
US$65 million12; other reports say that between 2003 and 
2013 the group made over US$200 million in ransoms.13 AQIM 
has also been thought to take part in human trafficking and 
the smuggling of cigarettes. Analysts debate whether it’s also 
directly involved in smuggling narcotics, which arrive from 
Latin America by ship in West Africa and are then transported 
across the Sahel to North African ports for distribution into 
Europe. It’s thought that the group allows the drug traffickers 
to pass through land controlled by it and under its paid 
protection.14 Whatever the sources of this money, the vast 
sums involved mean that the group can not only arm itself 
and recruit into its own ranks, but can arm, fund and supply 
other groups across the region—as was evident in the Mali 
incursion in 2013.
Mountains, where all the key populated areas are, including 
the capital city, Algiers, was the traditional area of operations 
for the group as well as its support base. However, new 
leaders emerged in the south of the country in the Saharan 
region. The most prominent was Mokhtar Belmokhtar, who 
was the regional commander in the area and was known to 
be operating an extremely sophisticated criminal network 
that specialised in smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. 
This group was far more international in both its operations 
and the ethnicities of its members. Fighters were drawn from 
Mali, Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Mauritania, and the group could 
operate across a vast geographical area due to the porous or 
non-existent borders in that part of the country.9
Upon Mustafa’s death in June 2004, Droukdel took over 
the leadership role as the GSPC came under a great deal of 
pressure from the Algerian military, which had driven the 
group south. Droukdel began to foster stronger ties with 
the al-Qaeda core because of its ideology and international 
connections. One way he achieved this was by providing 
training for a steady stream of Algerian, Moroccan and 
Tunisian fighters to Al-Qaeda in Iraq. But the number of 
GSPC fighters was dropping rapidly due to the Algerian 
Government’s reconciliation movement. It’s thought that 
the numbers dropped from 4,000 members in 2002 to under 
500 in 2006.10 Thus it was that the GSPC formally aligned with 
al-Qaeda in January 2007 and was renamed Al-Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb.
The GSPC/AQIM’s alignment with core al-Qaeda ideology also 
broadened its tactics and dramatically widened the area in 
which it conducted attacks. Before 2007, most attacks were 
focused in the northern coastal region of Algeria, where most 
of the government and population are. However, after 2007, 
attacks began to spread across the Sahel in Mauritania, Mali 
and Niger. The methods of attack also began to vary, and 
more frequent, coordinated and sophisticated bombings, 
including suicide bombings, began. The new tactics included 
simultaneous car bombings in Algiers on 11 April 2007, which 
targeted the Algerian Prime Minister’s headquarters (killing 
33 people) and a police station in the east of the city. The 
bombing of the UN building in Algiers on 11 December 2007, 
which left 31 dead and about 170 injured, brought AQIM’s 
metamorphosis to international attention.11
Despite its willingness to attack international targets within 
Africa, AQIM has yet to target mainland Europe. Threats 
were made to France after its intervention in Mali in 2013, 
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Figure 1: AQIM attacks
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replacement by a mid-level military officer, Captain Amadou 
Sanogo, as the nation’s leader.
The appearance of elements of AQIM and increasing numbers 
of foreign Islamist fighters in northern Mali created unease 
among observers, who thought that the region was in danger 
of becoming a new safe haven for al-Qaeda where fighters 
could train and equip, ready for jihad in the wider Sahel 
region. The joint declaration of an ‘Islamic State of Azawad’ 
by the MNLA and Ansar Dine reinforced that view.
AQIM has been a powerful ally for the MNLA and Ansar Dine, 
mainly because of the economic power it has accumulated 
from kidnappings and trafficking cocaine, hashish and 
cigarettes across western and northern Africa, but also 
because of the volume of military hardware that it has 
captured from fleeing Malian forces. This includes American 
military vehicles and satellite communications technology, 
as well as abandoned stores of artillery and rocket launchers 
and large stocks of small arms and ammunition. This 
combination of economic and military power has led to AQIM, 
in coordination with the MNLA, Ansar Dine and other allies, 
having direct influence over about 816,000 km² of territory in 
southeastern Algeria, northwestern Niger, eastern Mauritania 
and northern Mali.
Initially, all the signs indicated that an Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) force would be deployed 
into Mali to repel Islamist fighters in the north of the country 
in 2013. Much of the international community appeared 
reluctant to become embroiled in the fight; it was happy to 
back a UN mission to the country but not to commit troops, 
aircraft and vehicles.
In October 2012, the UN passed a resolution asking West 
African states under the ECOWAS banner to speed up 
planning for military intervention. It seemed that there was 
a ready-made force of 3,500 ECOWAS troops available for 
deployment, backed by logistical support from the US and 
France. However, as the planning intensified, it was felt that 
the Malian forces, which ECOWAS would be supporting, 
would require additional training and strengthening, and that 
the ECOWAS force wouldn’t be ready for deployment until 
September 2013.
For the various forces holding northern Mali, this was an 
opportunity not to be missed. The Ansar Dine group began 
pushing further south, seizing the strategically important 
Mokhtar Belmokhtar has been central to efforts to enhance 
AQIM’s influence in the Sahel and has increased the 
lawlessness in the region through his activities. His growing 
influence and independence from the northern elements 
of AQIM have made his relationship with Abdelmalek 
Droukdal very turbulent. This led to a rift between the two 
leaders in 2012, when Droukdal attempted to pass control 
of Belmokhtar’s area of operations in the south to Abu Zeid. 
This eventually led to Belmokhtar being expelled from AQIM 
and setting up his own group, al-Mulathameen (‘Masked‘) 
Brigade, which is also known as al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam 
(‘Those who Sign with Blood‘) Brigade. This group was 
responsible for the In Amenas gas facility attack in January 
2013, in which 800 people were taken hostage and 39 were 
killed in revenge for the French intervention in Mali.
Belmokhtar is hugely influential in the Sahel and has directly 
influenced politics and other Islamic and tribal groups in 
the region, especially in northern Mali. He spent most of the 
2000s influencing and establishing close relationships with 
the communities and tribes of the Azawad desert region, 
marrying into local Tuareg and Arab families to ensure 
his own security and freedom of movement across this 
vast expanse of the Sahel. In 2011, he steadily built up his 
influence in northern Mali to attempt to realise his wish for a 
regional Islamic caliphate centred there.15
The attempt to create a caliphate in Mali
In January 2012, the Malian rebellion began with the 
return to northern Mali of 2,000–3,000 angry, well-armed, 
battle-hardened Tuareg fighters who had been serving under 
Muammar Gadaffi in the previous year’s Libyan conflict. The 
impact of this influx of Tuareg fighters was compounded 
by the Malian Government’s lack of action to counter the 
problems they were causing. The uprising by the National 
Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and the 
Islamist Tuareg group Ansar Dine began with the killing of 
many government soldiers in a series of battles, which also 
led to a humanitarian crisis as tens of thousands of civilians 
fled the fighting. As the fighting intensified, the Malian 
military became increasingly incensed at what it saw as 
a lack of political will to end the rebellion and insufficient 
munitions, supplies and equipment to drive it back. On 
21 March 2012, a military-led mutiny culminated in the 
resignation of President Amadou Toumani Touré and his 
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was despite reports, two months earlier on 2 March 2013, 
by Chadian state television and the Chadian Army that 
Belmokhtar had been killed in a raid by Chadian troops on a 
terrorist base in Mali. He has recently announced a merger 
with the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa 
to create a new group—al-Mourabitoun—which he claims 
will ‘unify the ranks of Muslims around the same goal, from 
the Nile to the Atlantic’. This group he has helped form has 
the potential to become a significant influence in African 
extremism. Their public statements have clearly indicated 
an ideological allegiance to al-Qaeda, yet it may never be 
acknowledged publicly as an affiliate in order not to disrupt 
al-Qaeda’s standing relationship with AQIM. Belmokhtar’s 
renowned aggression and capacity to plan complex attacks 
on challenging targets indicate that the group has the 
capacity to garner further prominence in Africa. He’s a 
dangerous figure who has evaded capture multiple times and 
had a price of US$5 million placed on his head.
AQIM and its associates’ activities in the Sahel region are 
expected to continue, but with less likelihood of contributing 
to the overthrow of governments due to the continuing 
French regional presence. As yet, none of these groups has 
been dealt a knockout blow: they’re still operating across the 
Sahel, and they’re morphing all the time.
While AQIM hasn’t succeeded in creating a North African/
Sahelian caliphate yet, that intent is evident in its recent 
actions. The group’s leadership is highly ambitious but is 
moderated by prudence—they are willing to play the ‘long 
game’. Its willingness to attack international targets across 
Algeria and surrounding countries presents a challenge to 
the international community and businesses that are looking 
to work in the region. AQIM’s links to other Islamist groups 
in Tunisia, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia and Morocco, combined 
with its willingness to share weapons, training, finance and 
knowledge, mean that it presents a serious threat to regional 
security. And, if AQIM’s financial resources continue to grow, 
so too will its ambition, influence and ability to recruit.
Al-Shabaab—operating in Somalia, Kenya, 
Uganda and Djibouti
Al-Shabaab grew out of two Somali Islamist groups, the 
Islamic Union (al-Ittihad al-Islamiya) and the Islamic Courts 
Union (Ittihad al-Mahkim al-Islamiya, ICU) during the civil 
war in the early to mid-2000s. It began as a militant youth 
town of Konna. This demonstrated two things: first, the 
Malian Army had neither the will nor the support to repel 
the Islamists; second, as Konna is around 400 kilometres 
northeast of the capital city, Bamako, there was the distinct 
possibility that the insurgents would arrive at the capital in a 
short time. French intelligence services had detected plans 
for a major offensive, organised and coordinated by the local 
al-Qaeda franchise. This was confirmed when a large convoy 
of vehicles was seen heading towards the strategic town of 
Mopti. The possibility of an invasion of the capital city and 
control of the entire country by Islamists was the final straw 
for the international community, and especially for France, 
which has around 6,000 expats living in the country.
Dioncounda Traoré, then Mali’s interim president, wrote 
to both UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and French 
President Francois Hollande requesting urgent assistance. 
The French rapidly entered the conflict, providing air support 
for Malian troops, conducting bombing missions and sending 
a force of about 550 French troops from neighbouring bases. 
The prospect of a safe haven for Islamist groups was too 
much for Hollande, who stated that he had authorised the 
deployment to prevent Mali becoming a terrorist base on 
Europe’s doorstep.
This decisive course of French action halted AQIM’s ability 
to create a Malian safe haven, which would have spread 
further across the region as other governments struggled 
to cope with the group’s influence and power. However, 
while the Islamists have been repelled for the moment, their 
complete removal will be extremely difficult in a part of the 
country where enemy forces will be dispersed widely (it’s 
larger than Afghanistan) and that suits those who know the 
terrain well. Furthermore, the difficulties at the heart of Mali’s 
problems—a disillusioned military, a fragile political situation 
and a population with little access to sustainable economies 
and resources—will take some time to solve.
The reaction of AQIM and its partners has been to disperse 
into neighbouring Sahelian countries, regroup and fight 
a guerrilla-type campaign in a terrain in which they have 
extensive operational experience. Borders in that part of 
the world are highly porous, so the potential for ‘overspill’ 
into other regions is high. Belmokhtar demonstrated this 
when he claimed responsibility for simultaneous suicide 
and truck-bomb attacks on a French-owned uranium mine 
in Arlit, Niger, and a military base 150 miles away. This 
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international targets across the country. This also seemed to 
coincide with an enhancement in bombmaking skills, which 
was attributed to the numbers of highly trained foreign 
fighters who were beginning to filter through al-Shabaab’s 
training camps in Elberde and Mogadishu. The merger of the 
two groups was publicly announced in February 2012 by the 
al-Shabaab emir and Ayman al-Zawahiri. However, it’s 
possible that the association with al-Qaeda has weakened 
al-Shabaab. The factions have become more divided about 
the direction of the group and whether its focus should be on 
local, rather than international, attacks.
The propaganda effort has also increased since 2008, and 
the pool of militants involved in al-Shabaab has diversified. 
The group has established the Kata’ib Foundation as a media 
wing. It produces online films and propaganda material and 
runs an English-language Twitter account, which have drawn 
foreign recruits into its ranks. Al-Shabaab has enjoyed some 
success in reaching out to the Somali diaspora in the US, 
Europe, the Middle East and Australia. Michael Adebolajo, 
one of the killers of British soldier Lee Rigby, was arrested 
in Kenya by Kenya’s counterterrorism police in 2010 for 
attempting to join al-Shabaab. He was deported back to 
the UK, but no charges were brought against him. However, 
wing of the ICU, but gained recognition during the civil 
war, especially after the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops 
in 2009. Its original leaders had all received training with 
al-Qaeda or other Islamist groups in Afghanistan, Kashmir 
or both. They included Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys, Adan 
Hashi Farah, Mukhtar Robow Ali, Ibrahim Haji Jama and 
Ahmed Abdi Godane. During 2013 and 2014, Godane 
became most prominent in the group through a brutal 
leadership struggle.16
Al-Qaeda praised the ICU and then al-Shabaab for a number 
of years before formally accepting al-Shabaab into the group 
in 2012. Al-Qaeda had helped to produce propaganda for the 
ICU, and as far back as 2006 bin Laden had endorsed the ICU 
in speeches.17 However, similarly to AQIM, it was around 2008 
when al-Shabaab began trying to align itself more formally 
with al-Qaeda’s core ideology and strategies and to integrate 
itself with the other al-Qaeda elements across Africa and the 
Middle East. It promised loyalty to bin Laden and offered 
training camps within Somalia. This was regarded favourably 
by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, who referred to the 
group as ‘my brothers, the lions of Islam in Somalia’.18 From 
that time, there was a notable increase in suicide bombings 
and attacks with improvised explosive devices on 
In this 13 February 2012 file photo, an armed member of the militant group al-Shabab attends a rally in support of the merger of the Somali militant group 
al-Shabab with al-Qaida, on the outskirts of Mogadishu, Somalia.  (AP Photo/File) via AAP.
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failed state for over 20 years. In 2013, the EU, with the UK 
playing a leading role, agreed to provide financial assistance 
to Somalia for peace and development, with the aim of 
reversing years of failure by the international community. It 
was only in September 2013 that the EU announced a 
€1.8 billion package to assist the Somalian Government’s 
would-be fighters are mostly recruited from neighbouring 
countries, mainly Kenya.
Until 2013, there had been a positive narrative from the 
international community about the increasing level of 
security in Somalia, which had been widely considered a 
Figure 2: al-Shaabab attacks
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both of whom were foreign nationals: Alabama-born US 
citizen Omar Hammami, known as ‘the American’ or ‘the 
jihadist rapper’, and a British national, Usama al-Britani, 
were both shot dead by Godane’s men in a dawn raid on 
their hideout. Al-Shabaab isn’t centralised or monolithic in 
its agenda or goals. Its rank and file members come from 
disparate clans, and the group is susceptible to clan politics, 
internal divisions and shifting alliances. Most of its members 
are mainly interested in the nationalistic battle to take 
over Somalia, but Godane’s rise to dominance brought the 
hardline global jihadist agenda to the fore, as evidenced by 
the attacks in Kenya.
Godane is suspected of being behind the bombing of a bar 
in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, during the 2010 World Cup 
final; 76 people were killed in the blast. The attack is thought 
to have been a demonstration of Godane’s anger at Ugandan 
troops operating in Somalia, and illustrates his willingness to 
place the fight in a regional context and to punish those who 
dare to stand up to his organisation. Since the June takeover, 
al-Shabaab has stepped up its bombing campaign with a 
suicide attack on a UN compound in Mogadishu in June 2013 
and an attack in September 2013 on a Mogadishu restaurant 
where foreign nationals were known to eat; both attacks 
killed 15 people.21
Kenya has suffered from terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda related 
groups and al-Shabaab before, most notably the 1998 US 
Embassy bombing in Nairobi and a string of smaller attacks 
closer to the border with Somalia. However, the Westgate 
Mall attack was clearly motivated by the presence in Somalia 
of 4,000 Kenyan troops in AMISOM, which has been driving 
al-Shabaab away from the major cities. Targeting foreign 
nationals is a powerful way to gain the world’s media 
attention and demonstrate that al-Shabaab remains a 
potent force.
But there’s an element of this tragic story that’s hard to 
square with the thesis that Godane is behind this attack. 
It’s been reported, but not confirmed, that a number of 
foreign fighters from the US, the UK, Finland, Canada and 
Kenya were involved.22 This wouldn’t align with Godane’s 
mistrust of foreign fighters, which led Ibrahim al-Afghani to 
write an open letter to Ayman al-Zawahiri, criticising Godane 
for targeting foreign jihadists, imprisoning them in secret 
detention centres and even killing them. However, the highly 
combustible combination of a brutal leader who’s highly 
efforts to establish order.19 At a conference in May that year, 
the British Government, along with other donors, pledged 
some £84 million in aid, and Prime Minister David Cameron 
announced that huge progress was being made in curbing 
piracy and tackling the Islamist insurgency in Somalia.20 With 
so much ‘progress’ being made, it was hard to understand 
how al-Shabaab carried out such a destructive attack on the 
Westgate shopping centre in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, 
resulting in 62 known deaths and more than 170 injured 
(see Figure 2).
It appears that the claims of progress were being backed 
up by the gains that African Union forces (AMISOM) have 
been making over the past few years. AMISOM wrested back 
control of the Somalian capital, Mogadishu, in 2011, and 
then in 2013 the southern port of Kismayo, a pivotal strategic 
position for al-Shabaab, from which it transported shiploads 
of illegal charcoal and distributed arms and other goods to 
parts of Somalia and beyond. Indeed, al-Shabaab has been 
forced to retreat to the rural areas of Somalia’s south and is 
largely fighting a guerrilla campaign, and there are signs that 
at last Somalia may be able to make some real progress.
The Kenyan attack had its roots in a fierce leadership 
battle fought over the past year within al-Shabaab, which 
may explain why it’s striking away from Somali borders. 
This might be an attempt to show strength during a time 
when the organisation’s suffering from dwindling support 
inside Somalia.
Factions and assassinations in Somalia
The leadership battle was won by Ahmed Abdi Godane, 
who in June 2013 assassinated four of al-Shabaab’s 
top commanders, including two of the organisation’s 
co-founders. One was Ibrahim al-Afghani, who was closely 
allied with bin Laden and had fought in Afghanistan. This 
action led to long-term spiritual leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir 
Aweys surrendering to Somali forces out of fear for his own 
safety. Aweys is largely against fighting an international jihad 
and is more concerned with battling Somali Government 
forces to create an Islamic State of Somalia, whereas Godane 
aligned more with the international cause of al-Qaeda and is 
seen as responsible for creating the links between al-Shabaab 
and the al-Qaeda core.
Godane’s takeover didn’t stop there. In early September 2013, 
he killed two other senior figures within the organisation, 
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recently, there’s been a spate of attacks on coastal tourist 
resorts on the eastern seaboard of Kenya. In June, at least 
60 people were killed in Lamu, and another 29 were killed 
in early July. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, although 
the Kenyan Government claimed that opposition political 
networks were responsible. The former explanation is more 
likely to be true, as Kenya has received widespread criticism 
for its handling of the Westgate attack; it wants to deflect 
perceptions that al-Shabaab is gaining ground in Kenya and 
doesn’t want its tourism trade collapsing as a consequence of 
the attacks.26
In addition, there’s evidence that the quality of the explosive 
devices being used in Kenya is improving—a further indicator 
of al-Shabaab assistance, involvement in the attacks or both, 
as the group’s bombmaking is highly developed. This was 
evident in March 2014, when a Kenyan of Somali descent was 
arrested and his vehicle impounded. Only later was it found 
to be packed with 130 pounds of plastic explosive welded 
into its rear seats, with a mobile phone detonator attached, 
and an AK-47, multiple rounds of ammunition and grenades. 
The explosives were thought to be enough to collapse a 
multistorey building.27
The Kenyan security forces’ response to al-Shabaab has 
been accused of being heavy-handed and potentially fanning 
the flames of recruitment to al-Shabaab within Kenya. In 
April 2014, under Operation Usalama Watch, thousands 
of ethnic Somalis were detained on suspicion of being 
illegal immigrants, and hundreds were deported back to 
Somalia. Until then, there had been a steady flow of Somali 
Kenyan fighters returning from Somalia as a direct result 
of the AMISOM mission in Somalia limiting of al-Shabaab’s 
operational footprint. Those that had returned bought with 
them the dangerous combination of combat experience and a 
radicalising message. There’s been evidence of radicalisation 
among Muslim youth in many parts of Kenya, especially in 
the northeast of the country, in the Nairobi slums and in the 
Kenyan coastal regions.28
Al-Shabaab has shown some resilience in the face of the 
pressure that the AMISOM forces, US drone strikes and 
special-forces operations have placed on it in Somalia, 
but an element of desperation has led to it widening the 
geographical area of its operations over the past two years 
to include Kenya, Djibouti and Uganda.29 Its aims continue to 
be focused on local Somalian grievances in the south-central 
motivated and an organisation that’s being backed into a 
corner might have led to a change in behaviour. Godane 
demonstrated that he was prepared to employ new tactics to 
demonstrate that the organisation wasn’t in decline.
The news that Godane had been killed in a US air strike in 
September 2014, means that al-Shabaab have lost their 
most influential figure head, who shaped their allegiance 
to al-Qaeda core, and internationalised their fight. But as 
General Carter F Ham, the retired head of the United States 
military’s Africa Command, stated about his death:
The effect will be positive, but not decisive…He has 
proven over the years to be an elusive figure, but one who 
has galvanized some elements with Al Shabab…His death 
will remove an effective terrorist leader from Al Shabab’s 
ranks, but it will not cause Al Shabab to suddenly crumble 
or, probably, to significantly alter course.23
Within days the group had announced a new leader, Ahmad 
Umar, also known as Abu Ubaidah, one of Godane’s most 
trusted lieutenants, and a devout and ruthless hardliner, 
and reaffirmed their allegiance to al-Qaeda. How this new 
leadership impacts the internal dynamics and future of the 
group is uncertain, however, they have already vowed to 
avenge the death of their leader. Any revenge attacks are 
likely to take place in Somalia or neighbouring Kenya, which 
has been increasingly targeted by al-Shabaab.
Effects on Kenya
There’s no doubt that the presence of Kenyan peacekeeping 
troops in Somalia has led to the increase in attacks in Kenya 
by al-Shabaab and potentially by people radicalised within 
Kenya. Since Kenyan troops’ arrival in Somalia in 2011, before 
the attacks on the Westgate Mall, there have been 30 attacks 
on Kenyan soil involving grenades or improvised explosive 
devices.24 They were mainly low-level attacks that were easily 
ignored by the Kenyan Government, as they hit the relatively 
poor areas in the northeast of the country, and when they did 
attack Nairobi the numbers of casualties were relatively low.
However, in the wake of the deaths at the Westgate Mall, 
there was a series of highly lethal attacks. In December 
2013, six were killed and 34 injured in a grenade attack in 
the capital city. In May 2014, bombs placed in a market in the 
capital killed 10 and injured 70, and in early May seven were 
killed and 80 injured in blasts in Mombasa and Nairobi.25 Most 
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the concept of transnational jihad with a reverent, but 
unsophisticated comprehension of the underpinning of 
theological concepts. Its grievances were previously largely 
localised, but there’s evidence that it has attempted to link 
local grievances to international situations in Mali and 
Somalia, and since 2010 the increasing influence of al-Qaeda 
has been evident in its tactics and strategies.30
Boko Haram’s roots can be traced back to the early 2000s, 
when it was led by Mohammad Ali, a Nigerian who had been 
radicalised in Saudi Arabia and, it was claimed, had fought in 
Afghanistan alongside the mujahideen.
Kayari Mohammed distinguishes three distinct phases in 
Boko Haram’s history.31 The first spanned from 2003 to 
2005, and was characterised by the group waging guerrilla 
war against the Nigerian state. Boko Haram first received 
attention for armed attacks that it launched against police 
stations and other public buildings in Nigeria’s northeastern 
Yobe state in late 2003 and early 2004. The group was 
eventually repelled by Nigerian forces and withdrew to a 
camp in Kanama on the border with Niger, whereupon it 
raised the Taliban flag, although it had no official links to its 
Afghan counterparts, and was dubbed the Nigerian Taliban.32
Although few in number, the membership of the group 
illustrated the complexity of the current Nigerian political 
part of the country, but there’s an increasing need not to 
underestimate the group’s ability to mount cross-border 
operations to attract international fighters to its cause. One 
of the greatest concerns is that al-Shabaab is helping to 
destabilise Kenya. Instability, combined with the inadequate 
responses of Kenyan security forces, could aid the group’s 
cause. Al-Shabaab will continue to exercise its linkages with 
AQIM, Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, to 
its own and al-Qaeda’s broader advantage.
Boko Haram—operating in Nigeria and the 
border intersection of Niger, Cameroon 
and Chad
In 2014, Boko Haram became etched in popular 
consciousness around the world due to the scale and brutal 
extremism of its violence, which has led to the deaths of 
around 1,500 people in the first half of 2014 alone and more 
than 4,000 in total in the past four years. But it was the 
kidnapping of more than 200 schoolgirls in Borno, Nigeria’s 
most northeastern state, that brought notoriety to the group 
and led to global campaigns to release the captives. Boko 
Haram is complex, and there’s a great deal of confusion about 
its influences, its aims and its inspiration, which appear to 
have morphed over the years. Although the group has been 
heavily influenced by the message of al-Qaeda, it approaches 
This screengrab taken from a video released on You Tube on 12 April 2012 apparently shows Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau (C) sitting flanked by militants. 
AFP PHOTO / YOUTUBE via AAP.
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particularly in Mali, and evidence that we’re seeing the 
internationalisation of another Islamist group.
Financial links to the al-Qaeda core can be traced to bin 
Laden’s time in Sudan in the early 1990s, when he allegedly 
met Mohammed Ali, who became his disciple and trained 
with him in Afghanistan. There are accounts that bin Laden 
suggested Ali set up a cell in Nigeria and provided him with 
a budget of perhaps $3 million in 2000.34 Since that time, the 
group’s finances have come from multiple sources, including 
Nigerian benefactors, kidnaps for ransom and other serious 
criminal activities, as well as from AQIM. Between 2000 and 
2002, bin Laden recorded two audio messages calling on 
Nigerian Muslims to create an Islamic state, demonstrating 
the links back to the al-Qaeda core. The links were reinforced 
in November 2012 in a 39-minute video posted on an 
extremist website by Abubakar Shekau, in which he praised 
al-Qaeda and the global jihad and spoke of Boko Haram’s 
solidarity with al-Qaeda’s leadership. This was not dissimilar 
to al-Shabaab’s 2008 video, which began the process of 
officially bringing that group under the al-Qaeda banner.35
There’s also evidence of Boko Haram’s increasing links to 
al-Qaeda franchises, particularly AQIM. In June 2010, the 
emir of AQIM, Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud (aka Abdelmalek 
Droukdel), stated in an interview that AQIM would provide 
Boko Haram with weapons, training and other support in 
order to expand its own strategic reach into sub-Saharan 
Africa, and to ‘defend Muslims in Nigeria and stop the 
advance of a minority of Crusaders’.36 AQIM itself has had a 
number of Nigerian recruits in its ranks and has been keen to 
bring Nigerian Islamists into its sphere of influence in order to 
exploit religious and social tensions in Nigeria.
There’s evidence that in 2012, before the French incursion 
into Mali, up to 100 Boko Haram fighters had joined and were 
training with the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
(a splinter group of AQIM), and many Boko Haram members 
had been receiving training in the jihadist training camps 
in northern Mali.37 There’s also evidence of links between 
Boko Haram and al-Shabaab. Nigerian security officials 
have reported that Mamman Nur, who’s thought to be Boko 
Haram’s second in command, returned to Nigeria from 
Somalia in the late spring or early summer of 201138, and 
those reports were reinforced by a June 2011 statement by a 
Boko Haram spokesman. African Union forces in Nigeria also 
context: it included children of notable public figures 
and politicians, alongside children of a local wealthy 
businessman. The Nigerian Government faces extreme 
difficulties in restraining Boko Haram, and one of the 
contributory factors is the way members of the government 
are at times complicit in Boko Haram’s actions and quietly 
supportive of the group.
The second phase that Mohammed outlines is the period 
from 2005 to 2009. This began with the ousting of the group 
from its Kanama camp and ended with the violent Nigerian 
Government suppression of Boko Haram in 2009. This period, 
during which the group both swelled and radicalised its 
membership, was marked by the return of Mohammed Yusuf 
from exile in Saudi Arabia. Yusuf became the leadership 
focus for Boko Haram and managed to establish his own 
mosque and school in Borno’s capital, Maiduguri. Many 
of the new members of the group were refugees from the 
wars over the border in Chad or jobless Nigerian youths. It 
isn’t entirely clear where the group obtained funding, but it 
appears that Yusuf was able to attract support from Salafist 
contacts in Saudi Arabia, and potentially from wealthy 
northern Nigerians.33
The third phase began in July 2009 with a large-scale 
crackdown by Nigerian security forces, which left the group 
severely weakened and resulted in the death of Yusuf in police 
custody on 31 July. The government had decided to meet the 
violence of Boko Haram with violence of its own. But despite 
this response and the removal of the group’s figurehead, 
Boko Haram was far from defeated. It went underground, 
regrouped, expanded its manpower and reinvigorated its 
leadership, with Abubakar Muhammad Shekau taking over. 
Then, in 2010, Boko Haram returned with such force that 
it shocked not only the Nigerian Government but also the 
international community at large.
Boko Haram’s changing tactics and its links to 
other al-Qaeda inspired groups
The 2010–2014 period has demonstrated how Boko Haram 
has become ever more aware of the international dimensions 
of its actions and has been increasingly influenced by the 
message of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Despite its grievances 
remaining mainly local, there have been attempts since 
2010 to link that agenda to international developments, 
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training individuals have received in Somalia and Mali and 
the growing international influence of the group. Until 2010 
and 2011, the group focused mainly on local targets in the 
northeast of Nigeria, aiming at government workers and 
security forces. The targets were then expanded to include 
Christians, critical Muslim clerics, traditional leaders, those 
suspected of collaborating with the government, bars 
and schools. The 2011 attack on the UN building in Abuja 
demonstrated that Boko Haram’s ability to reach into the 
southern parts of the country had increased, as had its 
desire to strike against international targets. There have also 
been increases in the number of coordinated bombings and 
attacks and the numbers of casualties, especially during 2013 
and 2014 (see Figure 3).
In many cases, the increase in fatalities has been caused by 
new methods of attack. Like AQIM in Algeria and al-Shabaab 
in Somalia years before it, Boko Haram introduced suicide 
bombing for the first time in Nigeria in June 2011, when a 
car bomb was used to attack a police barracks in Abuja. 
This coincided with the return of Boko Haram fighters 
from training in Somalia and with AQIM. The increasing 
sophistication of Boko Haram’s methods is reflected in 
the quality and power of the explosives it has used since 
2010. Pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN)45 and triacetone 
triperoxide (TATP)46 have been used more frequently in 
attacks, and often shaped to magnify the explosive power of 
the charges, which shows how technical knowledge has been 
shared with the group. Both these explosive types have been 
popular with al-Qaeda throughout its campaigns.
While the links between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda and its 
franchises are becoming clearer, so far the group hasn’t made 
a direct request to become a franchise of al-Qaeda. What’s 
also evident is that Boko Haram isn’t entirely united, and 
some have described it as being a ‘franchise’ in and of itself. 
This reflects the fact that many different groups operate 
under its banner as and when it suits them.47 
There are thought to be six Boko Haram factions currently 
operating, the largest of which is led by Shekau and is 
responsible for most of the attacks in recent months. 
Worthy of note and of most concern to Western analysts is 
the emergence of the Ansaru group, which announced its 
formation in January 2012. Its ranks are mainly made up of 
Western-educated members, led by Abubakar Adam Kambar 
(until his death in August 2012) and Khalid Barnawi, former 
confirmed that Boko Haram members had received training 
in Somalia:
We want to make it known that our Jihadists have arrived 
[in] Nigeria from Somalia where they got serious training 
on warfare from our brethren who made the country 
ungovernable and forced the interim government to 
relocate to Kenya. We want to assure all security agencies 
that we would frustrate their efforts. By the grace of God, 
despite the armoured carriers that they are boasting of, 
they are no match with the kind of training we acquired 
in Somalia.39
Nur, who is believed to be the mastermind behind the 2011 
bombing attack on the UN building in Abuja, is himself 
evidence of the growing regionalisation of Boko Haram, 
having been born in neighbouring Chad. The group has also 
been recruiting vigorously in Cameroon, and there have been 
reports that hundreds of young Cameroonians have been 
trained by the group and are ready to operate within that 
country’s borders.40 Attacks in the northeast of Cameroon 
increased during 2014 (the most notable was the kidnapping 
of the Cameroonian Vice-Prime Minister’s wife in July 201441). 
Along with Chad and Cameroon, Niger and Mali have also had 
Boko Haram members operating within their borders, and 
recruitment is taking place in those countries. This illustrates 
how a previously localised agenda and set of grievances are 
being internationalised, emulating the al-Qaeda model.
Weapons have been flowing from Niger, Cameroon, Chad42 
and Libya, which has become a regular source of weaponry 
across northern Africa and the Sahel since Muammar Gaddafi 
was overthrown in 2011.43 With highly porous borders in the 
northeast of Nigeria, the movement of Boko Haram across 
vast expanses of unmonitored land makes it exceedingly 
difficult for Nigerian security forces to contain the problem, 
and in some cases the military crackdown on the group has 
intentionally dispersed fighters into neighbouring countries 
in order to push the problem away from Nigeria. Boko Haram 
members can move easily between nations in the northeast 
due to the lack of border controls, but also because of 
shared ethnicity: many fighters are from the dominant ethnic 
group, the Kanuri, or other ethnic groups that aren’t bound 
by borders.44
Since 2010, Boko Haram’s tactics and strategies have become 
increasingly sophisticated, indiscriminate and geographically 
more widely spread. This could well be a result of the 
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[T]he broader explosion in violent activity across 
northern Nigeria since 2012 reinforces the notion that 
Boko Haram has developed into a brand whose ‘franchise’ 
has been adopted by all sorts of other organisations.49
The Nigerian Government response
Creating coherent responses to this major security challenge 
is enormously difficult for the Nigerian Government, which 
has largely found itself on the back foot in dealing with the 
problems that Boko Haram has created. The government 
has been criticised for its sluggish responses to outbreaks of 
Yusuf allies who trained with AQIM and al-Shabaab. It has 
distanced itself from Shekau’s indiscriminate killings and 
claims to instead want to target Westerners and high-profile 
authority figures, as is evident from its attacks and 
activities.48 What the group has managed to do is to further 
confuse an already unclear picture in Nigeria. Pantucci and 
Patel state that:
Having claimed responsibility for attacks in areas 
traditionally dominated by Boko Haram … Ansaru has 
further complicated Western efforts to gain an insight into 
the psyche of Islamic fundamentalism in Nigeria …  
Figure 3: Boko Haram attacks
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multiple complaints from the Nigerian military that it lacks 
adequate weapons to fight Boko Haram, and some soldiers 
have refused to deploy to the northeast without better 
equipment.51 In addition, the government has looked to 
introduce new counterterrorism legislation, examined the 
possibility of dialogue with Boko Haram (without success), 
declared a state of emergency in the northeast and launched 
major military offensives against the group. The results have 
violence and killing in the north of the country. Furthermore, 
the Nigerian security forces have been accused of using 
heavy-handed tactics, creating resentment among the local 
population in the north.50
The government has increased the defence budget in order to 
provide the military and police with the capability to counter 
Boko Haram, from around $625 million in 2010 to $6.25 billion 
in 2012. Despite the additional funding, there have been 
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number of fighters. The financial success of the groups 
indicates that they’re capable of supporting a long-term 
fight within the region. The regions’ porous borders allow 
for a freedom of travel that would confound most Western 
states and make illicit transfers of weapons and people 
commonplace and low risk.
The membership of these groups can be transient, making 
tracking the personnel involved exceedingly difficult. The size 
and shape of the groups shifts according to their operational 
needs and the amount of funding available to support larger 
networks. Extreme poverty in all the countries discussed 
here means that the groups provide an alternative source of 
income and support where local governments do not, and 
they play upon local socioeconomic conditions to further 
their causes.
None of the groups outlined in this paper is as coherent as 
some media reports would lead us to believe. They survive 
through complex networks and loose affiliations that suit 
the conditions in which they operate. They don’t adhere 
strictly to al-Qaeda’s core principles and its international 
aims of attacking the West. They all follow a localised agenda, 
in which linkages to al-Qaeda ideology provide additional 
profile and status. However, the transnational nature of their 
attacks and operations pull other nations into their centre of 
gravity, making them dangerous for broader African security.
AQIM, al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are operating across 
borders, beyond their countries of origin. This destabilises 
governments struggling to provide for their own national 
security and economic stability, let alone to deliver 
counterterrorism strategies against imported threats. This 
was evident in Mali, where the government failed to deal 
with the combination of groups taking over in the north of 
the country and the threat was repelled only because of the 
international community’s response. Nigeria is also a serious 
cause for concern, as it has an escalating and increasingly 
transboundary problem in the north; the same can be said of 
the impact of al-Shabaab in Kenya and the wider region.
For the international community, the danger lies not so much 
in the immediate threat to Western targets from African 
Islamists, but in the potential future creation of a failed state, 
or large ungoverned spaces. That would provide a base 
for training and radicalising large numbers of Islamists, as 
Afghanistan did during the 1990s and Mali had the potential 
to do in 2012 and 2013. Although Islamists no longer control 
been limited, and the fact that attacks in 2014 have increased 
in both frequency and numbers of casualties does not point 
to a successful campaign by the Nigerian Government or a 
rapid conclusion to the troubles.
What’s clear is that the indicators aren’t of a group in decline, 
but of one that’s gaining a greater territorial foothold in 
northeastern Nigeria, where Shekau is confident enough to 
claim the existence a caliphate. As yet, it’s unclear whether 
he was declaring that he was part of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s 
call in northern Iraq earlier in 2014, or referring to the 
re-establishment of a separate Nigerian caliphate, which 
existed in the 19th century.52 Regardless, it’s clear evidence 
that if this situation is left unattended by the international 
community it has the potential to spiral further out of control 
and have dangerous regional security impacts.
Grasping at shadows—a region without 
borders
All the Islamist groups discussed in this paper have the 
intent and capability to assist one another. They share their 
members’ skills in bombmaking, combat tactics, propaganda 
methods, radicalisation and recruitment methods, and 
simple public messaging in support of one another’s causes. 
The network of connections between the groups is of greatest 
concern to Western and African agencies, as it multiplies 
capability. Skilled individuals within these organisations are 
prepared to travel and share their skills with others. This has 
the potential to create regional turmoil in Africa, slowly but 
surely sucking other states into the violence, and this longer 
term trend needs to be closely monitored. If it’s allowed to 
develop further, both the violence and influence over African 
governments by al-Qaeda inspired groups could increase.
The greatest facilitators of such a transfer of skills and the 
growth of Islamist groups’ memberships and capabilities 
are the regional geography, porous or non-existent borders, 
socioeconomic conditions, poor regional governance 
structures, and easy access to weapons. The 2011 Libyan civil 
war released an array of small arms and heavy weaponry 
into the North African and Sahel regions. Those weapons 
have equipped terrorist organisations operating in those 
regions, but also circulate far beyond them to fuel further 
destabilisation. The transnational criminal activity of the 
Islamist groups outlined in this paper provides the financial 
resources to procure the weapons and to support a larger 
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efforts to minimise the groups’ operating space and ability 
to raise funds. Winning back the hearts and minds of local 
populations and harnessing their cooperation will be the 
key to the response, starving the groups of local support and 
removing their ability to continue unrestricted cross-border 
movements.
Unfortunately, if the situation is allowed to continue, there 
could be increasing instability in the regions in which the 
groups operate and a growing influence of al-Qaeda and 
other violent Islamist ideology.
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Acronyms and abbreviations
AMISOM African Union Mission to Somalia
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
GIA Group Islamique Armé (Algeria)
GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat  
 (Algeria)
ICU Islamic Courts Union (Somalia)
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham
MNLA Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (Mali)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
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